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Abstract 
Extensive cooperation among biologically unrelated individuals is uniquely human and 
much current research attempts to explain this fact. We draw upon social, cultural, and 
psychological aspects of human uniqueness to present an integrated theory of human 
cooperation that explains aspects of human cooperation that are problematic for other 
theories (e.g., defector invasion avoidance, preferential assortment to exclude free riders, 
and the second order free rider problem). We propose that the evolution of human 
cooperative behavior required (1) a capacity for self-sustained, self-referential thought 
manifested as an integrated worldview, including a sense of identity and point of view, 
and (2) the cultural formation of kinship-based social organizational systems within 
which social identities can be established and transmitted through enculturation. Human 
cooperative behavior arose, we argue, through the acquisition of a culturally grounded 
social identity that included the expectation of cooperation among kin. This identity is 
linked to basic survival instincts by emotions that are mentally experienced as culture-
laden feelings. As a consequence, individuals are motivated to cooperate with those 
perceived culturally as kin, while deviations from expected social behavior are 
experienced as threatening to one’s social identity, leading to punishment of those seen as 
violating cultural expectations regarding socially proper behavior.  
Key words: Human cooperation; cultural evolution; idea systems, social identity; free 
riders; emotion and feeling, worldview 
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Introduction 
Humans cooperate to an extent that defies biological expectations. As noted by Darwin 
(1871:179), human cooperation is evidenced by traits that include patriotism, fidelity, 
obedience, courage, sympathy, and willingness to sacrifice for the common good, which 
we will refer to collectively as ultrasociality. How did individuals acquire these traits 
given that they may impose strong, even fatal burdens on individual fitness? And can 
such traits persist in a population without succumbing to free riders and cheats?  
 
Yet, ultrasociality is a universal characteristic of human societies (Turchin 2013). Even in 
groups of close biological kin, humans are more cooperative than would be expected if 
genetic relatedness and/or direct reciprocity were the only factors involved (Mathew et al 
2013). Although humans may act in spectacularly uncooperative ways, and non-human 
animals sometimes appear to act cooperatively (Packer 1977; Watts 2002; Clutton-Brock 
2009; Silk, et al 2013), human cooperation is unique in its degree and scope. A 
particularly significant aspect of human cooperation is its flexibility. Humans not only 
cooperate in large groups of biologically unrelated individuals, there is a great deal of 
flexibility as cooperative behavior is adjusted to adapt to new circumstances.  
 
There have been extensive efforts to resolve the paradox of human cooperation by 
explaining it in terms of individual traits arising through culture-gene coevolution 
(Richerson and Boyd 2005; Richerson, et al 2010; Bowles and Gintis 2011; Mesoudi 
2011; Richerson and Christensen 2013; Richerson, et al 2016). Culture-gene coevolution 
is modeled in terms of inclusive fitness (Taylor, et al 2007; West and Gardner 2013; 
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Birch and Okasha 2014; Bourke; 2014; Okasha, et al 2014) and/or multilevel selection 
(Wilson and Sober 1994; Okasha 2005; O’Gorman, et al 2008; Gardner 2015). Despite 
extensive debate among advocates of these two approaches (e.g., West, et al 2007; 
Kramer and Meunier 2016), they have been shown to be predictively (but not causally) 
equivalent (Okasha 2016).  
In biological evolution the mechanisms of variation and selection operate on individual 
phenotypes, resulting in differential trait distributions across a population. When an 
analogue of this model is applied to cultural evolution, it has been found that selection 
acting on group level traits becomes a significant factor in addition to selection acting on 
individual traits. Current theorizing, based on culture-gene coevolution, has focused on 
reconciling the consequences of these two different levels of selection. In culture-gene 
coevolution theories, groups compete for resources, or for survival in a harsh 
environment, and group selection favors groups in which individuals coordinate their 
cooperative activities. This sets up a tension between within-group selection, which tends 
to favor selfish individual traits, and cultural group selection, in which the group level 
traits acted on are cultural in nature so that selection favors cultural traits arising from the 
expression of more altruistic or prosocial individual traits1.   
The critical distinction between humans and other animals in culture-gene theories is the 
capacity for cumulative cultural transmission (Gabora 1998; Boyd 2018). Cultural traits 
are said to be selected for based on their utility in satisfying necessities of individual and 
group survival. Culture, in turn, produces a social and material environment such that 
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group-beneficial cultural traits will tend to be tuned to human psychological and 
behavioral tendencies. As expressed by Henrich and Boyd (2016), “Intergroup 
competition will favor those group-beneficial cultural traits… that most effectively 
infiltrate and exploit aspects of our evolved psychology.” This is said to lead to genetic 
adaptation for individual traits such as imitative behavior, prosocial preferences, and 
norm following, all of which, it is argued, contribute to cultural adaptation and 
transmission (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Boehm 1999, 2012; Richerson and Boyd, 2005; 
Boyd, et al 2005; Chudek and Henrich 2011; Sterelny 2012; Bowles and Gintis, 2011; 
Heyes 2012).  
These theories, however, fail to provide an integrated explanation for several key aspects 
of human cooperation, which this paper aims to address. These include: (1) how the 
selective balance between cultural group selection and within-group selection on 
individuals is shifted to favor cooperation enhancing behavior by individuals within a 
cultural group; (2) how this is maintained against invasion by defectors; and, (3) what 
stabilizing factors might be in operation. Explanations offered by existing culture-gene 
theories appeal to cultural transmission, positive assortment of cooperators, punishment 
of defectors, and appeal to the social emotions (e.g., guilt and shame). However, they 
neither offer an explanation of how these factors actually promote stable cultural 
transmission of cooperative behavior nor of how stable transmission relates to unique 
elements of human biology and psychology. The culture-gene approach has been 
characterized as the “puzzle paradigm” and may be incapable of providing these 
explanations (Cowden, et al 2017). Dual inheritance theories focus on trait evolution 
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whereas it is necessary to address the “co-evolution of human cognition, societal 
organization and society’s engagement with the environment (Read and van der 
Leeuw 2015)” (Sterelny, 2012; van der Leeuw 2018:2). 
Other than the initial assumption of cumulative cultural transmission, culture-gene 
theories say little about human uniqueness. Analysis is carried out using methods that 
could apply to any species. Appealing to cultural traits that exploit an evolved human 
psychology does not, in and of itself, address how this psychology actually produces 
cooperative behavior. Nor does it say anything about the relationship between cultural 
traits, individual psychology, and human biology. It cannot explain why social emotions 
exert such a strong influence on individuals, how these emotions are influenced by 
culture, or how culture coopts human biological instincts so as to produce cultural, and in 
particular cooperative behavior.  
Outline of Proposed Theory 
To explain how individuals conceive of, and understand, both their behavior and that of 
others requires a shift in perspective to thinking in terms of top down culturally 
prescribed patterns of coordination and cooperation. We explain cooperation not in terms 
of traits at the individual level that yield cooperation as an emergent trait at the 
population level, but in terms of cultural idea systems that constitute the “organizational 
or conceptual universe of a community and the principles that govern it, that make it 
coherent and thereby make it objective for its adherents” (Leaf and Read 2012: 48). 
Cultural idea systems frame the structure and organization of social interaction as 
structured patterns of affectively salient prescriptions, prohibitions, and interpretations, as 
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well as stories, schemas, myths, narratives, and understandings that become incorporated 
as elements of the worldviews of group members2 (Read 2003; Leaf and Read 2012; 
Gabora, 2004).  
 
Individual worldviews are self-sustaining internalized webs of knowledge, beliefs, 
attitudes, ideas, affections, and expectations (Gabora 2004) arising through interactions 
between personal experience and the experience of being enculturated into a system of 
cultural ideas that informs, guides, and provides a common means for evaluating 
behaviour (Leaf and Read 2012). From this conceptual foundation of worldviews and 
cultural idea systems, transmitted through enculturation, we can develop explanations 
relating culture, human psychology, and human biology in ways that show the 
interconnections between evolved human psychology and culturally mediated human 
behavior. 
 
We propose that the foundational factor for human uniqueness is the evolution of brains 
capable of supporting reflective self-consciousness. We distinguish between self-
consciousness and reflective self-consciousness in a way similar to Edelman’s (2004) 
distinction between primary consciousness and higher-order consciousness. Beyond a 
simple awareness of sensations, by reflective self-consciousness we mean being aware of 
oneself as the individual self that is having those sensations, together with the capacity to 
reflect on that self both historically and as projected into the future, including perspective 
taking, analogy making, and the capacity for self-triggered recall (Gabora and Steel 2017; 
Gabora and Smith in press). It is this that enabled humans to assimilate elements of 
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experience into a coherent, culture-laden understanding of the world—a worldview—that 
included a consciously recognized social identity defined by group membership and 
social roles. With this, cultural systems of social relations, in particular kinship systems, 
developed as determining factors in human behavior (Read 2012a; Moffett 2013). 
Kinship systems are paradigmatic exemplars of what we mean by cultural idea systems.  
In the manner that group-level traits are understood in much of the culture-gene literature, 
functionality for the group emerges from the individual level as group members “function 
cohesively to maximize fitness (reproductive success) at the higher level” (O’Gorman et 
al 2008). In this bottom-up framework, culture arises through individual phenotypic 
behavior and sets the environment within which individual traits evolve. Synthesis of 
these traits over the group yields emergent group level traits. In this framework, 
cooperative behavior is grounded in individual phenotypic traits and so it supposedly can 
be treated with the methods of evolutionary population biology; for example, through 
appropriate partitioning of terms in the Price equation (Kramer and Meunier 2016; 
Okasha 2016).  
In contrast, cultural idea systems are not emergent from individual traits. Rather, they are 
top-down schemas for how individuals are to understand events and act (Read 2003; Leaf 
and Read 2012). Therefore, though a cultural idea system manifests itself in a group-level 
phenotypic manner, this differs qualitatively from the way others (e.g., Chudek and 
Henrich 2011; Smaldino 2014; Richerson et al 2016) consider group-level traits to be 
emergent from individual traits.  
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Cultural idea systems provide group members with synchronized modes of attention, 
interpretation, and emotional attunement that allow group syntonization3 for cooperative 
action. These systems permeate a culture: individuals are enculturated from birth with the 
behavioral, institutional, and normative instantiations of these systems. Through this 
enculturation, cultural idea systems exert a formative influence on individual worldviews. 
Enculturated individuals experience the behavior, interpretations, institutions, and norms 
involved in the social expression of cultural ideas as parts of the natural and social order. 
In this way, cultural idea systems serve the essential role of enabling mutual 
understanding among members of the social collective. As such, they can be sources of 
functionality at the individual level because individuals gain benefits by conforming to 
and contributing to group level cultural schemas and prescribed roles (Read 2012a).  
 
Cultural idea systems and individual worldviews are intimately connected. Worldviews 
are the medium through which cultural idea systems are transmitted across generations, 
anchored by material and social forms (symbols, monuments, institutions, rituals) that 
gain meaning only as they are understood by individuals whose worldviews have been 
enculturated within the corresponding cultural idea systems as children are taught the 
cognitive and affective meaning of external cultural manifestations and social behavior 
(e.g., Quinn 2006).  
 
Focusing on cultural idea systems as vehicles of individual understanding and 
cooperative behavior requires demonstration of strong connections among culture, 
Running Head: Identity, Kinship, and the Evolution of Cooperation 
10 
individual psychology, and human biology. We find such connections by distinguishing 
between emotions, defined as physiological reactions to salient cues, and the culture-
laden mental feelings that accompany these physiological reactions (Damasio 2010; 
LeDoux 2012; Barrett 2017). Socially appropriate responses to contextually evoked 
emotional reactions are mediated by cultural idea systems that provide context dependent 
interpretations of, and proper behavioral expressions for, the associated feelings4 
(Voorhees et al 2018).  
The emotion/feeling connection is two-way. External cues can elicit culturally formulated 
feelings that trigger an emotional response (Damasio 2010). Thus, threats to a culturally 
based social identity, or to the group identity within which social identity is embedded, 
may evoke physiological reactions as if the threat were directed at the biological 
organism. This can lead to a defensive impulse to punish those perceived as going against 
cultural ideals or norms shared by group members (Cikara, et al 2011; Cikara and Van 
Bavel, 2014). As a result, there is no second-order free rider problem in our theory. That 
is, a second-order free rider problem exists only if there is uncertainty as to whether 
group members who have agreed to punish defectors will actually fulfill this commitment 
should the occasion arise. In our theory, the impulse to punish free riders and defectors 
arises automatically as a defensive response to a perceived threat to one’s social identity. 
This establishes both internal and external controls on cheating. Cheaters risk punishment 
by threatening the social identity of their cultural kin even as they distance themselves 
from the social group upon which survival depends5.  
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When individuals become self-identified as members of a social group, this membership 
is incorporated into their social identity and behavioral expectations regarding other 
group members are seen as cultural obligations. The relevant difference between an 
expectation and an obligation is that the former, if unmet, may result in an individual 
frustration/anger/rage reaction while the latter, if violated, invites group-supported 
sanctions against the violator.  
In sum, because current theories of human cooperation do not address how minds and 
societies function as integrated wholes, they cannot account for several aspects of human 
cooperation that we address here. We posit that individuals gain social identity through 
group membership and role performance; this identity is conditioned by cultural idea 
systems that structure individual worldviews and mandate behavioral expectations and 
obligations, including cooperation with cultural kin. Moreover, we propose that the link 
between biological emotions and culturally laden feelings results in cooption of defensive 
reactions based in survival related neural circuits for the defense of both individual social 
identity and the groups from which this identity derives.  
Identity, Point-of-View, and Kinship 
We now consider the concept of individual identity and its expression as a point of view, 
centered in an individual worldview. We argue that cooperative behavior requires not 
only the recognition that other group members also have points of view that may differ 
from our own, but also a means of bringing disparate points of view into alignment. 
While incidents of signaled group identification and joint intentionality (Moffett 2013; 
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Tomasello 2014) are precursors of collective cooperation, we suggest that it was the 
advent of cultural kinship systems among our Paleolithic ancestors that provided the 
keystone for stabilizing individual points of view into a collective cultural understanding 
(see Read 2012a).  
 
Some non-human primates appear to be self-aware according to the mirror test (Gallup Jr. 
1970; Povinelli et al. 2003). Even without this recognition, however, primate awareness 
can be exquisitely sensitive to social nuances, yet remain unreflective. Seyfarth and 
Cheney, for example, (2000:902) suggest that: “Although monkeys may behave in ways 
that accurately place themselves within a social network, they are unaware of the 
knowledge that allows them to do so: they do not know what they know, cannot reflect on 
what they know, and cannot become the object of their own attention.” (emphasis added)  
 
In contrast, humans do not merely pursue their own benefit; they are aware of their 
identity as individuals, and as members of a social group. Humans are persons, in a way 
that other apes are not. A human becomes a person not through biological birth, but by 
developing the capacity for self-triggered thought and an integrated worldview with a 
point of view that becomes aligned with the point of view of kin, which in turn involves 
being integrated into a cultural group through group recognition of their personhood. 
Humans recognize themselves both as individuals and as members of a social collective, 
and they are recognized as such by other members of this collective. This means humans 
possess something more than what is commonly called theory of mind. Theory of mind 
refers to the capacity to recognize that others have mental states (Tomasello 2014). There 
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is a critical difference, however, between recognizing that others have mental states, and 
understanding that not only is there another creature with mental states, but this other 
creature is like oneself (e.g., as a member of a conceptualized group), thus is 
simultaneously different (not–self), yet similar (a creature of the same kind). This 
requires the cognitive ability to abstract from a collection of similar objects or entities 
and grasp a categorical concept binding that collection into an abstracted unity (Read 
2012b; Gabora and Smith in press). It is this that allows members of a human foraging 
band to conceptualize “we” in reference to the band as a whole, something that appears to 
be outside the purview of chimpanzees as suggested by the fact that chimpanzee 
communities do not act as a social unit6 (Whiten and Erdal 2012). 
A more complex situation arises with awareness that others not only have mental states, 
but also a point of view. It might seem that attribution of mental states automatically 
includes attribution of a point of view, but this need not be the case. To imagine that 
another individual has a point of view requires being able to abstract from ones’ own 
mental states to the recognition of a self with the capacity to reflect upon those states, 
then attributing this capacity to others. The other becomes an individual rather than just a 
locus of mental states. We refer to the recognition that others not only have mental states, 
but also points of view as theory-of-person. When Tomasello (2014) proposes “joint 
intentionality” as a prime factor leading to human cooperative behavior and relates this to 
theory of mind, he is appealing, in our terms, to theory-of-person.  
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It can be argued that acting so as to deceive another by inducing a false belief (behavior 
found in other primates) indicates awareness of the other as having a point of view that 
can be misdirected, but it is more parsimonious to see this as simply acting so as to 
produce a mental state in another in order to achieve an immediate selfish purpose. 
Theory-of-mind without theory-of-person invites deception; it leads to the impulse to 
produce a desired result by manipulating the mental states of others. No more substantial 
recognition of the other is required. Theory of person leaves room for cooperation—it 
leads to the question: “How can I act in our mutual best interest when our points of view 
are in alignment?” Because cultural idea systems are distributed among group members, 
the worldviews of culture-bearers share a common understanding of the meaning of 
behavior arising through those idea systems, facilitating alignment in points of view 
(Read 2012b). Hence, three pre-conditions are necessary for our theory of cooperation: 
(1) the coalescing within individuals of experiences into an integrated worldview with a 
point-of-view, (2) theory-of-person and (3) a means of aligning different points-of-view. 
These conditions require cognitive capacities unique to late members of the genus Homo 
(Read 2008; Read and van der Leeuw 2008).  
The best candidate for how disparate points of view could have been brought into 
alignment among our Paleolithic ancestors in a stable and transmissible way is through 
the formation of a system of culturally expressed kinship relations as the basis for social 
organization, group identity, and group boundaries (Read 2012a,b). Kinship provides a 
system of conceptual relations interconnecting individuals in a manner that enables the 
perspective of one individual to be transformed into that of another (Read 2003). It gives 
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answers to the individual question “Who am I?” and the social question, “Who are We?” 
by transforming biological birth into a position within a cultural kinship system (Sahlins 
2013). This cannot be reduced to biological relations since the cultural importance of 
birth is not that it produces a member of the species Homo sapiens, but that it yields a 
person with a social identity, distinguishing an infant as a person, as “one of us.” As a 
child develops to maturity within a cultural context, being “one of us,” together with the 
concomitant behavioral, ideational, and affective conditions and constraints that this 
implies, becomes an intrinsic aspect of the child’s identity7.  
 
Cultural Idea Systems, Identity, and Worldview 
The variety of world cultures is large, but there are fundamental elements in all 
cultures—kinship, religion, hierarchical striving, and political systems of social 
organization, to mention a few. These commonalities arise because culture provides  
templates, schemas, and scripts, as well as stories and myths, for socially productive 
transformations of universal human instinctual drives (Goddard and Wierzbicka 2004; 
Matsumoto 2007; Tsai 2007; Trommsdorff and Cole 2011; De Leersnyder, et al 2013). 
From birth onward, processes of enculturation embed these patterns in individual 
worldviews in the form of prescribed and proscribed behavior, beliefs, and attitudes that 
come to be experienced as natural, obvious and unquestionable (Spradley and Mann 
1975; Weissner 1998).  
 
In the processes by which infants individualize themselves by formulating personal ideas 
and perspectives (Barnett 1953), cultural idea systems provide organizing patterns that 
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give internal structures of belief and interpretation together with external channels for 
socially acceptable behavioral expression of basic concerns, wants, desires, and needs. 
Core elements of a worldview are affectively tagged constructs of personal identity, 
group identity, and individual and group purpose (Markus and Kitayama 1991, 2010; 
Mantovani 2000; Narvaez 2013). Human children are taught not only the necessities of 
immediate survival, but also how to think symbolically about the world. They are taught 
the rites, practices, attitudes, and beliefs that sustain both personal and cultural identities. 
They are taught what behavior deserves respect, what is decent, and what are worthwhile 
achievements (Mantovani 2000; Handerwerker 2015). Culture forms the warp and weft 
of their thought, upon which the tapestry of identity is woven.  
What is the ontology of the cultural ideas systems that structure individual worldviews in 
ways that provide for mutual understanding within the cultural group? The answer, in 
many cases, is recursive—cultural idea systems not only structure, but exist within, the 
worldviews of group members (Gabora 2004; Gabora and Aerts 2009). This is not to say 
that there are no external indicators, linguistic formulations of, or pointers to cultural 
ideas; these are ubiquitous in material culture, normative rules, and social institutions. 
Such indicators have significance, however, only to the extent that individuals identify 
the external indicator with an understood meaning8. Thus, a major focus of child rearing 
across cultures is the forging of links in the child’s mind between external indicators of 
cultural meaning, and internal experiences that substantiate them (e.g., Quinn 2006).  
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Although manifested across material and social vehicles, cultural idea systems exist 
primarily in the worldviews of group members, while simultaneously structuring these 
worldviews by providing frameworks for assimilation of, and accommodation to, 
experience (Gabora 2004, 2006). The idea systems, external indicators, and individual 
worldviews coevolve as the worldviews respond to private and social experience. Thus, 
we suggest that what evolves in cultural evolution, beyond changes in surface elements of 
culture, are worldviews (Gabora 2004, 2013, Gabora & Aerts, 2009, Gabora & Steel, 
2017; Gabora & Smith, in press; Lane et al. 2009).  
 
Worldviews lack the algorithmic structure necessary for their evolution to be modeled in 
analogy to the genetic case in which environmental selection on phenotypes results in 
changes in the frequency distribution of an underlying genotype. They do, however, 
possess the structure necessary to evolve through a more primitive, non-Darwinian form 
of evolution called communal exchange (Vetsigian, et al 2006). Each entity in a 
communal exchange process is self-organizing—a stable global organization emerges 
through interactions amongst its parts (Prigogine and Nicolis 1977). It is also 
autopoietic—it is subject to top down dynamic constraints that both maintain and 
reproduce its organizational structure (Maturana and Varela 1980). Like entities that 
evolve through variation-selection, entities that evolve through communal exchange 
produce self-variants; e.g., as is posited was the case with the early evolution of 
protocells prior to the appearance of RNA assembly codes (Farmer, et al 1986; Kaufman, 
1993; Hordijk, 2013). Without a self-assembly code, the fidelity of this primitive 
Running Head: Identity, Kinship, and the Evolution of Cooperation 
 18 
replication in cultural evolution is lower than that of replication using a self-assembly 
code, but it is sufficient for cumulative, open-ended evolution.  
 
Worldviews are resilient in that they self-organize in response to perturbations (such as 
inconsistencies or perceived threats to self-image), and they can be transmitted through 
social learning. Like an organism, a worldview is self-mending to the extent that people 
are inclined to explore possibilities and revise interpretations to establish or restore 
consistency (Osgood and Tannenbaum 1955; Greenwald et al 2002; Gabora and 
Merrifield 2012). A worldview is also self-regenerating: an adult shares knowledge and 
attitudes with children (and other adults), thereby influencing the conceptual closure 
processes by which worldviews form and transform. As they develop, children expose 
aspects of what were previously adult worldviews to different experiences, thereby 
weaving unique internal models of the relationship between self and world.  
 
While we argue that worldviews evolve through mechanisms of communal exchange that 
operate at both the level of the individual worldview and the level of culture, we do not 
suggest that all changes in worldviews produce corresponding changes in cultural idea 
systems, e.g., the worldview of a person who migrates from a rural community to a large 
urban center may change substantially while the cultural idea systems that structure their 
understanding and interpretation of behavior might remain virtually unchanged.  
 
Cultural Idea Systems and Group Level Traits  
Running Head: Identity, Kinship, and the Evolution of Cooperation 
 19 
Cultural idea systems do not arise from the group-level synthesis of individual traits, 
either behavioral or genetic. Rather, they provide top down frameworks enabling 
individuals to interact in culturally appropriate ways, and individuals gain benefits only 
by behaving in accord with these prescribed forms. They establish the way that 
enculturated individuals interpret the experiences of everyday life, and their beliefs about 
how they ought to behave as participants in a jointly shared and objectified cultural 
reality (Hardin and Higgins 1996; Jost, et al 2007) if they are to remain members of the 
social collective and gain the corresponding fitness benefits.  
 
Everett (2008) gives a good example of how a cultural idea system can structure social 
behavior and worldviews in his study of the Piraha, a tribe of about 300 to 400 people 
who live on the Maici River in the Brazilian province of Amazona. The Piraha language 
is perhaps the simplest language known and, among other unusual characteristics, it 
appears to lack recursion, subordinate clauses, and sense of time (although this has been 
challenged, e.g., see Reich 2012). The Piraha have no creation myths, and their cultural 
memory extends at best only slightly longer than a single generation. The explanation 
offered is that there is a primary cultural idea system that includes the injunction that one 
does not speak of what is not a matter of personal experience. This disallows complex, 
abstract thought and connections to the past, and constrains the language to be essentially 
a language of the present. This cultural idea system dominates all aspects of Piraha life so 
that selecting any particular manifestation of it as the associated group level trait is like 
trying to select a particular tree as representative of an entire forest.  
 
Running Head: Identity, Kinship, and the Evolution of Cooperation 
 20 
Most researchers, though, use a bottom up approach focused on individual traits in order 
to attempt to understand social organization. Smaldino (2014, 2016) attempts to depart 
from this by making an analogy to the genotype-phenotype distinction, defining group 
level traits as “the phenotypic effects of social organization.” In his view, just as selection 
acting on the biological phenotype leads to changes in gene frequencies, selection acting 
on emergent group phenotypes (the performance of groups in action) leads, he asserts, to 
changes in a group’s organizational structure. The focus, however, remains on individual 
traits that allow effective role performance.  
 
In addition, Smaldino’s  discussion of cultural evolution using an analogy to biological 
evolution based on variation and selection is at best partial, and potentially misleading. 
The genome of an organism constitutes a self-assembly code that generates the phenotype 
while remaining shielded from direct external influence. Social groups, cultural idea 
systems, and worldviews lack self-assembly codes and their organizational structure is 
not shielded from direct selective action. Cooperative performance that depends on 
specialized roles introduces the relational system governing group organization as an 
additional factor that is independent of the individual traits of group members. Depending 
on how they are organized as a group, five young humans may constitute a variety of 
entities: a rock band; a basketball team; or, a criminal gang, for example, and the same 
five individuals could, conceivably, be all three. The organization is not found in the 
individual group members, nor does it emerge from their individual or group behavior. 
Rather, the organizational structure of group action is a socially given construct that 
defines the nature of the activity and does not exist outside of the social context. It is an 
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institutional fact (Searle 2010; Smit et al 2011) that determines behavior and creates the 
behavioral result9.  
Cultural idea systems are distinct from the institutions, organizational systems, and norms 
that are their social manifestations. While these institutions and norms may potentially be 
considered as group-level traits, changes in a cultural idea system may not be indicated 
by corresponding changes in the associated institutions and norms, and vice versa. 
Because cultural idea systems are distributed across many aspects of group culture, 
determining associated group-level traits is problematic.   
The distinction between a cultural idea system and its associated institutions and norms is 
illustrated by marriage (see Chit Hlaing and Read 2016). The cultural idea system of 
marriage is embedded in virtually every aspect of a society and, superficially, may be 
identified with formal institutions and customs. The institution of marriage in a society 
involves constraints such as who can marry, dowry or bride price, negotiated family 
alliances, celebratory rituals, civil or religious performances, sentimental expressions, and 
many other cultural elements. That there is a difference between the idea system of 
marriage and the institution of marriage is shown by the recent debate over same sex 
marriage in the United States (Read 2017). The terms of this debate show that it has not 
simply been a matter of extending the institutional character of marriage to same sex 
couples. Many opponents of same sex marriage were willing to allow equivalent 
institutional rights to be assigned to same sex partners, but same sex partners seeking to 
marry wanted something more than just institutional recognition of rights and privileges, 
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while those opposing same sex marriage believed they were defending something sacred. 
What was at issue was that the idea of same sex marriage involved a change in the 
underlying cultural idea system, in particular, as it related to prescribed gender roles 
within a marriage, even as the institutional structures remained essentially unchanged.  
 
Kinship as a Cultural Idea System 
Kinship is the basic cultural idea system for assimilating a child into a social collective, 
and the functionality of kinship for a child stems from the collective identity that is 
provided by virtue of her or his kinship relations (Leaf and Read 2012). In societies such 
as hunter-gatherers, kinship relations link group members into a coherent whole, and 
provide the vocabulary for group members to communicate with each other regarding the 
interplay of collectively recognized kinship relations in everyday behavior (Read 2012a; 
Bird-David 2017).  
 
While any discussion of early human behavior will be speculative, we believe that the 
origin of kinship systems, with the concomitant development of socially structured 
identities that become objects of reflective thought, played a pivotal role in a major 
change that occurred during the Middle to Upper Paleolithic in Homo sapiens—the 
uncoupling of social systems from space and time dependency (Gamble 2010; Leaf and 
Read 2012). Like present-day non-human primate social systems, earlier ancestral social 
systems for Homo sapiens would have been space dependent, with the maximal social 
group being composed of a collection of individuals living together. Time dependency is 
seen today in the fission-fusion form of chimpanzee social organization composed of 
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small social units of males that are stable only on a time scale of hours to days (see 
references in Read 2012a).  
 
Moffett (2013) makes a (non-exclusive) distinction between societies in which 
individuals are aware of other group members through direct recognition (“individual 
recognition societies”) and those in which recognition is based on identifiable markings 
distinguishing those who are group members from those who are not (“anonymous 
societies”). Having distinctive group recognition signals allows group size to grow 
beyond the limits imposed by the necessities of individual recognition (e.g., Dunbar 
1992). In this picture, initial boundaries of Paleolithic anonymous societies would have 
been established through recognizable group markings, beginning with distinct forms of 
non-linguistic vocalization. Without formal structuring, however, these markings would 
tend to drift, leading to division arising within a group as a population increased in size.  
 
The space and time dependency of this form of social organization might be less than that 
of individual recognition societies, but identity signals for groups extended over wide 
spatial areas would drift, and the long-term temporal stability of group markings would 
be fragile. The best that could be expected would be a fission-fusion form of social 
organization in which a group might grow in size and spatial extent over one or two 
generations only to then collapse back to an aggregate of smaller groups. While early 
hominin societies likely developed group identification signals and markings, allowing 
within group cooperative behavior to some extent, these societies would have been 
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unstable, resulting in social groups splitting as drift in group identifying marks took place 
and disputes arose without means for formal resolution (Moffett, 2013).  
In the Upper Paleolithic, however, space and time dependent forms of social organization 
changed to something like the band-level form found in present day hunter-gatherer 
societies (Read 2012a; Read and van der Leeuiw 2017). Band-level social organization 
typically consists of a number of stable, spatially distributed residence groups, each built 
around family-level social units, with extensive integration across space and through time 
by the movement of families among residence groups.  
Weissner (1998) suggests that the transition to band level organization was facilitated by 
an evolved psychological susceptibility to indoctrination. This, in addition to well-
established social conformity biases (e.g., Asch 1955) allowed homogenization of 
behavior and understanding across local residence groups. This allowed the formation of 
(at least partially) anonymous societies, but more is required to stabilize these societies 
against spatial and temporal drift. We suggest that the essential element was formation of 
formal kinship systems, developed by our ancestors during the Upper Paleolithic (Leaf 
and Read 2012: Chapter 3). Kinship systems produce a stable space and time independent 
form of social relations for a society as a whole, hence are the organizational key to band-
level social structures (Read 2015a). The appearance of the hunter-gatherer type of social 
systems in the Upper Paleolithic would not have been possible without the development 
of conceptually formulated systems of kin relations (Read and van der Leeuw 2015), 
eventually encapsulated in kinship terminologies that made it possible for participants in 
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social interaction to recognize their respective positions in a shared, culturally 
constructed system of kinship relations (Leaf and Read 2012; Read 2015a,b).  
Kinship systems include prescriptions to the effect that those who are kin to one another 
should be mutually supportive, as expressed in Forte’s (1969) Axiom of Prescriptive 
Altruism. Prescription, of course, need not translate into behavior, and in reality kin can 
be selfish, uncooperative, and mean spirited. What is critical is that those breaching 
prescriptions can be called to account by their kin.  
In hunter-gatherer societies, those who are not kin are strangers, and may be treated as 
enemies (Read 2012a). At least before European contact led to major changes in their 
traditional ways of life, altruistic behavior in hunter-gatherer bands, especially with 
regard to strangers from beyond the culturally recognized group, was uncommon 
(Marlowe 2010). Referring to the !Kung San, Weissner (2009:133) notes that “There is 
little evidence… that it is a part of human psychology [for them] to be willing to engage 
in altruism… in a social and cultural vacuum. When the faces and forces of culturally 
defined institutions are reintroduced, sharing and giving resume.”  
Among the Hadza, sharing occurs because of kinship obligations or relations, such as a 
man providing meat for his his children or his wife’s mother (Marlow 2010: 170) or 
because of the demands of others when they see someone with meat (Marlow 2010: 251). 
Rather than sharing meat altruistically, Hadza men will hide meat so as to avoid having to 
meet sharing obligations (Marlow 2010: 238 – 239). In general, as discussed in Read 
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(2012b), in hunter-gatherer societies the members of a residence group own food 
resources in the wild collectively and it is the members of the residence group that have 
the right of access to those resources. Low risk resources (food sources that are abundant, 
small in size, predictable with regard to their occurrence, and only requiring skills 
common to all adults to procure them) are culturally transformed into individual 
ownership when procured by an individual. High risk resources (food resources that are 
large, variable and unpredictable, and requiring special skills to procure effectively) are 
not transformed culturally into individual ownership by the actions of a hunter. Instead, 
collective ownership is transformed into individual ownership by cultural rules for the 
distribution of the hunted animal. Altruism, as an analytical concept, only applies to items 
that are individually owned; outside of the family what is individually owned is not 
distributed altruistically. 
The concept of a system of kinship relations expressed symbolically through kin terms, 
with a computational logic that enables kinship relations to be worked out through those 
kin terms (Read 2007), provides the foundation for the ties binding individual worldviews 
into a collective cultural worldview that can act as a seed for the stable transmission of 
cultural idea systems across generations (Read 2012a). This provided a strong 
evolutionary advantage for both individuals and groups: “The evolution of socially 
defined kinship… permitted the construction of broad social security networks for risk 
reduction by granting access to human and natural resources lying outside the 
[immediate] group” (Weissner 1998: 134).  
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Although the appearance of kinship systems seems to presuppose a pre-existing degree of 
cooperation, we do not believe this gives rise to a chicken or egg problem. From the time 
of the divergence of the ancestors of Homo and of Pan,  the evolutionary path to Homo 
sapiens exhibits several interconnected threads, including changes in morphology, 
technology, diet, encephalization, changes in social behavior, division of labor, male-
female relations, cognitive abilities, and so on. In particular, greater cognitive capacities 
enabled a cultural means to circumvent  the cognitive bottleneck faced by the African 
great apes arising from individualized behavior coupled with social organization based on 
face-to-face interaction that, if left unchecked, would increase social complexity 
exponentially (Read 2012a). The critical, culturally based social difference that 
distinguishes Homo sapiens from other primates is the escape from this bottleneck that 
was provided by a shift from social organization based on face-to-face interactions to a 
culturally grounded, relationally based form of social organization (Read 2012a). Moffett 
(2013) sees this in terms of a transition from individual recognition societies (face-to-
face) to anonymous societies. However, as we have indicated, more than the 
establishment of group recognition signals is required; namely, the working out of 
culturally transmitted systems of kinship relations.  
 
Cognitively, this required the capacity for self-triggered recursive thought, which enables 
manipulation of raw experiences such that they cohere with and relate to one another, 
often achieved through the development of stories and narratives (Gabora, 1999, 2000; 
Gabora & Steel 2017). It additionally requires contextual focus: the ability to shift 
between different modes of thought, a convergent mode conducive to mental operations 
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involving relationships of causation, and a divergent mode conducive to mental 
operations involving correlation, or similarity (DiPaola and Gabora 2009; Gabora 2003, 
2010). These two abilities enabled them to not only structure goal directed sequences of 
thought, which is within the cognitive capacity of other primates, but to grasp abstract 
relations and then manipulate and apply them recursively (Gabora and Kitto 2013; 
Gabora and Smith in press; Read 2012a). For example, the ability to abstract the concept 
of a mother-child relation from observation of incidents of mothering behavior, and then 
the ability to compose this relation to arrive at the mother of a mother, or grandmother 
concept. This provides the basis for working out other genealogical relations and, 
eventually, bootstrapping from genealogical terms to formal kinship systems. Group 
boundaries are then determined by those who can recognize that they are kin to each 
other (Read 2012a). The ability of two individuals to establish their kin relationship to 
each other was stabilized through the development of a computational system of kin 
relations we refer to as a kinship terminology (Read 2007). Working out a computational 
system of kin relations was a remarkable intellectual tour de force that likely occurred 
during the Upper Paleolithic (Leaf and Read 2012). The functionality of this evolved, 
socially constructed system of kin relations could not have been realized without 
transmission through enculturation, which also establishes coordination and shared 
understanding among group members (Read 2010, 2012a: 165-167).  
 
Emotions, Feelings, and Identity 
We have argued that cultural idea systems, and the individual worldviews that these idea 
systems both structure and are carried by, coevolve primarily through mechanisms of 
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communal exchange. These idea systems incorporate prescriptions for cooperative 
behavior, and the individual identities established through these idea systems thus express 
expectations of cooperation with those culturally recognized as kin, and self-sacrifice for 
the benefit of the group. In this section we ground this argument in individual psychology 
and biology.  
Humans congregate in marked groups and make personal sacrifices for the benefit of the 
group even if it is not composed of close genetic kin, and even if no personal benefit, 
either direct or indirect, accrues. In culture-gene theories this is explained via group 
selection for social emotions, evolved as individual genetic adaptations that are favored 
because they supported non-biological kin cooperation in small human groups under 
conditions where such cooperation confers substantial group benefits (Bowles and Gintis 
2011; Moffett 2013; Tomasello 2014). What is lacking is an explanation of why these 
emotions exert such powerful influence on behavior. One assumption might be that the 
experience of feelings such as guilt or shame is unpleasant, hence people tend to avoid 
behavior resulting in such feelings. While this idea carries some weight, shame and guilt 
are easily quelled through indignation and self-justification so additional assumptions are 
required; for example, that they act preemptively to deter behavior that is likely to incur 
social censure (Bowles and Gintis 2011).   
In contrast, we propose that the psychological power of the social emotions is found in 
the human capacity for (and vulnerability to) identification with ideas, beliefs, symbolic 
cues, and other group markings; that is, indoctrination (Weissner 1998). Group 
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membership and the associated group markings, norms, and ideals, are interjected as part 
of an enculturated identity (Atran 2016; Abrams et al 1990; Heine 2001; Burke and Stets 
1999; Stets and Burke 2000; Ellemers, et al 2002; Hornsey 2008; Swann Jr., et al 2014; 
Weissner 1998). Through this process a linkage is formed between social identity and 
survival related circuits in the brain that are recruited for defense of both social identity 
and the groups upon which this identity depends. This linkage arises through a two-way 
interaction of emotions and feelings10.  
An emotion is a complex of physiological responses to survival related stimuli. 
Associated with this is the qualitative feeling that arises in the mind as a result of the 
emotional response (Damasio 2010). While emotions are directly connected to biological 
survival instincts, the associated feelings are culture-laden. Cultural idea systems provide 
interpretations for feelings and prescribe culturally acceptable channels for their 
expression (Mesquita and Walker 2003; Tsai et al 2007; Koopmann-Holm and 
Matsumoto 2011; De Leersnyder, et al 2013; Gervais and Fessler 2017). These same 
cultural idea systems contribute to social identity through valorization of group 
membership and role performance, often grounded in painful past shared experiences 
(Whitehouse et al 2017) that lead to identity fusion between the individual and the group 
(Swann Jr., et al).  
While some researchers link emotions to dedicated circuits in the brain evoked by salient 
stimuli, others relate them to more general survival circuits found in many species 
(Phillips et al 2003; LeDoux 2012; Pessoa and McMenamin 2016). The essential point is 
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that the neural basis for the emotions is tied directly to biological survival, while the 
corresponding feelings can be evoked through culturally loaded cues and, when a feeling 
is so evoked, it can produce an emotional response that reinforces the feeling in a 
positive feedback loop (Damasio 2010). As a result, apparent threats to social identity, or 
to the groups in terms of which this identity is defined, can produce emotional responses 
grounded in powerful instincts of biological survival. We are thus able to address two 
issues faced by theories of cooperation: the problem of assortment, and the second-order 
free rider problem.  
Mathematical and simulation models suggest that in order for a cooperative group to 
avoid invasion by defectors, cooperators must preferentially assort with other cooperators 
(Nowak and May 1992; Nowak and Sigmund 2004; Lehmann and Keller 2006; Jackson 
and Watson 2013). Further, they must punish non-cooperators and even those who fail to 
cooperate in punishing. The concept of strong reciprocity was introduced to describe this 
behavior (Fehr, et al 2002; Bowles and Gintis 2004) but, as with ultracooperation, strong 
reciprocity is uniquely human, and, arguably, could not have evolved through processes 
involving only individual inclusive fitness (Fehr, et al 2002; Stephens 2005; Read 
2012b).  
The assortment problem is to determine how cooperators can carry out the preferential 
assortment required to exclude free riders and the second order free rider problem arises 
from the question of whether or not individuals who agree to participate in punishment of 
defectors will actually do so if the need arises. We address both assortment and free 
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riding in terms of the culturally determined social identities taken on by individual group 
members. These identities are interlinked through shared cultural idea systems that 
provide a framework for preferential assortment, prescribe expected behavior in social 
interactions, and cue defensive emotional reactions when faced with defection.  
 
To the extent that a person identifies with a group or a social role, they will experience 
feelings of guilt and/or shame at failing to live in accord with that identification, and will 
feel validated, enhanced, and justified at successful adherence to their social self-image. 
Expression of such feelings, or exhibition of physiological signs of the associated 
emotions, is a signal to others that an individual adheres to shared norms of cooperation, 
hence is a suitable partner for cooperative behavior. Jablonka et al (2012), for instance, 
suggest that blushing evolved as a social signal of emotional response indicating, in 
context, the presence of a particular feeling and the corresponding emotion.  
 
To address the second order free rider problem, Bowles and Gintis (2011) argue that 
punishment involves an innate impulse of retribution, but do not account for how such an 
innate impulse arises. Our theory provides a detailed account of how this can happen. 
Perceived deviations from expected behavior can elicit feelings that trigger threat 
responses, evoking emotions that are felt as indignation and anger (Ellemers, et al 2013; 
van der Toorn, et al 2015). This can serve to intensify the initial feelings in a positive 
feedback cycle that results in punishing deviant behavior. In this way, maintaining social 
identity, and the social group that supports it, is directly connected to the imperatives of 
biological survival. This manifests in in-group/out-group conflict as well when perceived 
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threats to group identification marks trigger defensive responses: “the perception of 
threats to symbols is a common issue in aggression toward other societies” (Moffett 
2013: 249).  
There is also a degree of internal control over the temptation to defect. Going against a 
social or cultural expectation or norm may be self-perceived as a justifiable personal 
attempt to gain benefit, carrying an associated danger of punishment, but it may also be 
experienced as a denial of identity, requiring defensive justification. Disruption of the 
patterns of relationships inherent in what is experienced as “one’s self,” presents a threat 
to that self  (Branscombe et al 1993; Ellemers, et al 2002; Ellemers 2012; Tritt, et al 
2012). Similarly, the perception that another group member is violating an expected 
pattern of social behavior cues feelings/emotions motivating reactions of indignation, 
condemnation, and an impulse to punish (Ellemers, et al 2013; Van der Toorn, et al 
2015). In sum, punishment of defectors does not arise from previous agreement, but as an 
immediate felt emotional impulse, triggered as a response to identity threat, and enacted 
through forms prescribed by a cultural idea system. Hence, no agreement to punish is 
required and yet punishing behavior will occur when faced with individuals exhibiting 
deviance from expected behavior by those exhibiting marks or signals of group 
membership.  
The problem of second-order free riders only arises if the question is how a group of 
inherent cooperators can resist cheaters. Starting from the premise that, biologically, 
individuals are all cheaters, the problem is not one of punishing cheaters; it is how to 
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build a cultural idea system and enculture individual worldviews with that system such 
that the cultural meanings and expectations of the associated social identities exclude 
cheating. The cultural idea system overrides biological impulses that say, “be a cheater,” 
because the cost of cheating is high. To put it simply, being recognized as a cheater 
defines an individual as an untrustworthy kinsman in a context in which survival depends 
on having good relations with one’s kin (Read 2012b).   
 
Summary and Discussion 
We propose that human cooperation should be viewed as a component of how individuals 
understand who they are by virtue of the cultural context within which they are 
embedded, which expresses cooperative behavior as part of a culturally defined identity. 
The cultural identity of a !Kung San hunter, for example, says that he cannot act as an 
individual with individual interests, as expected from a biological model of behavior; 
rather, as a cultural individual he is expected, and expects, to act cooperatively.  
 
Through the evolution of the capacity to weave individually and culturally acquired 
knowledge into a self-organized, loosely integrated worldview (Gabora, 1999; Gabora & 
Aerts, 2009; Gabora & Steel, 2017; Gabora & Smith, in press), hominids became capable 
of reflective self-consciousness. This permitted the conceptual abstraction of self and 
group identities, eventually enabling the development of kinship systems as a stable basis 
for cooperative behavior with those identified as cultural kin.  
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Kinship and other cultural idea systems exert top down control on group members 
through patterns of behavioral expectations and obligations that transform basic 
biological response impulses into socially prescribed behavior (Markus and Kitayama 
1994; Weissner 1998; Ochsner and Gross 2005; Barrett et al 2007; Cikara, et al 2011). 
Multi-level selection favors cultural idea systems that provide channels of behavioral 
expression for biological impulses such that coordinated group cooperative living 
becomes possible. Beginning in early infancy, enculturation, as a process of 
indoctrination (Weissner 1998), establishes psychological barriers against deviance that 
exist with sufficient strength that in some cases even a deviant thought is felt as a threat, 
and suppressed.  
 
This multi-level organization, in which cultural idea systems structure individual 
worldviews that recursively act as hosts for, and transmitters of, these idea systems, is 
predicated on the evolved capacity for abstraction of group identities from aggregates of 
similar entities, and the concomitant capacity for reflective thought about these identities. 
It is this that enables humans to conceptualize themselves as individuals who are also 
identified as group members, while simultaneously tying their individual identity to top 
down behavioral prescriptions associated with that membership.  
 
Psychologically, the linkage of feelings and emotions connects social identity to the 
individual biological self, which then leads to recruitment of survival related neural 
circuits for defense of the social self and the groups on which this self relies. Biological 
defensive reactions such as fight, flight, or freeze are transformed into multiple forms of 
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culturally mediated response behavior, including indignation at, and an impulse to 
punish, those perceived to violate one’s cultural identity expressed through cultural idea 
systems and worldviews.  
What we have presented here is a synthesis of research from multiple disciplines into a 
theoretical framework that can explain human cooperation. Directions of research 
highlighted by our theory are the need to: (1) Determine and describe the relations 
between the cognitive, emotional, social, and psychosomatic aspects of personal and 
social identity; (2) Determine the mechanisms by which external inputs and cues evoke 
responses energized by survival related neural circuits; (3) Clarify the neural circuits 
underpinning behavioral responses to both positive and negative social input; (4) 
Construct testable models of multilevel selection acting on cultural idea systems and 
worldviews (c.f.,  Read 1987); (5) Consider whether there is a deeper aspect of identity 
that appears in the direct recognition of an other as another like myself, beyond social and 
cultural conditioning (e.g., Sahlins 2013). 
Extensive research is being carried out in many fields seeking to elucidate cultural and 
psychological aspects of ultrasociality, social identity, emotion, how these are connected, 
the underlying neural circuits, and how these factors interact in behavior (e.g., Phillips et 
al 2003; De Dreu et al 2010; Cikara, et al 2011; Dawes et al 2012; Jablonka, et al 2012; 
Cikara and Van Bavel 2014; Jensen, et al 2014; Nummenmaa et al 2014; Özkarar-
Gradwhol et al 2014; Chang, et al 2016). To date, however, this work has not been 
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integrated into a unified understanding of human behavior. We hope the theory of human 
cooperation provided here will make a fruitful contribution. 
Acknowledgments  
This work has been partially supported by NSERC grant 62R0653 to Liane Gabora. The 
theory outlined in this paper was presented in outline form at the 2015 (Phoenix) and 
2016 (Amsterdam) Complex Systems Conferences, in a seminar at Santa Fe Institute in 
April 2016, and at the inaugural Conference on Cultural Evolution (Jena) in September 
2017. We thank Samantha Thomson for assistance in preparation of the manuscript and 
several anonymous referees for their detailed comments on earlier versions of 
this manuscript. 
References 
Abrams, Dominic, Margaret Wetherell, Sandra Cochrane, Michael A.Hogg, and John 
C.Turner (1990) Knowing what to think by knowing who you are: Self-
categorization and the nature of norm formation, conformity and group 
polarization. British Journal of Social Psychology 29:97 – 119.  
Asch, Solomon E. (1955) Opinions and social pressure. Scientific American, 193(5): 31– 
35. 
Atran, Scott (2016) The devoted actor. Cultural Anthropology 57 Supplement 13, S192 – 
S203. 
Running Head: Identity, Kinship, and the Evolution of Cooperation 
38 
Barnett, Homer Garner (1953) Innovation: The Basis of Cultural Change NY: McGraw-
Hill.  
Barrett, Lisa Feldman (2017) How Emotions Are Made. NY: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. 
Barrett, Lisa Feldman, Batja Mesquita, Kevin N. Ochsner, and James J. Gross (2007) The 
experience of emotion. Annual Review of Psychology 58:373 – 403.  
Birch, Jonathan and Samir Okasha (2014) Kin selection and its critics. BioScience 65 22 
– 32. 
Bird-David, Nurit (2017) Us, Relatives: Scaling and Plural Life in a Forager World 
Oakland: University of California Press. 
Boehm, Christopher (1999) The natural selection of altruistic traits. Human Nature 
10(3):205 – 252.  
--- (2012) Moral origins. New York: Basic Books.  
Bourke, Andrew F.G. (2014) Hamilton’s rule and the causes of social evolution. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 369 20130362, doi: 
10.1098/rstb.2013.0362. 
Bowles, Sam. and Herbert Gintis (2004) The evolution of strong reciprocity: cooperation 
in heterogeneous populations. Theoretical Population Biology 65:17 – 28. 
--- (2011) A cooperative species. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
Boyd, Robert (2018) A different kind of animal. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Boyd, Robert and Peter J. Richerson (1985) Culture and the evolutionary process. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
Boyd, Robert, Peter J. Richerson, and Jospeh Henrich (2011) The cultural niche: Why 
social learning is essential for human adaptation. PNAS 108 suppl 2:10918 – 10925. 
Running Head: Identity, Kinship, and the Evolution of Cooperation 
39 
Branscombe, Nyla R., David L. Wann, Jeffrey G. Noel, and Jason Coleman (1993) In-
group out-group extremity: Importance of threatened social identity. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin 17:381 – 388. 
Burke, Peter J. and Jan E. Stets (1999) Trust and commitment through self-verification. 
Social Psychology Quarterly 62:347-366. 
Chit Hlaing, F. K. L. and Dwight W. Read (2016) Why marriage?: A question about the 
foundations of kinship. Structure and Dynamics 9(2): 52-65. 
Chudek, Maciej and Joseph Henrich Culture-gene coevolution, norm psychology and the 
emergence of human prosociality. Trends in Cognitive Science 15(5) 218 – 226. 
Cikara, Mina and Jay J. Van Bavel (2014) The neuroscience of intergroup relations: An 
integrative review. Perspectives on Psychological Science 9(3):245 – 274.  
Cikara, Mina, Mathew M. Botvirnick, and Susan T. Fiske (2011) Us versus them social 
identity shapes neural responses to intergroup competition and harm. Psychological 
Science 22:306 – 313. 
Clutton-Brock, Tim (2009) Cooperation between non-kin in animal societies. Nature 
462:51 – 57. 
Cowden, Daniel, Kimmo Eriksson, and Pontus Strimling (2017) A popular 
misapplication of evolutionary modeling to the study of human cooperation. 
Evolution and Human Behavior 38, 421 – 427. 
Damasio. Antonio (2010) Self comes to mind. New York: Pantheon. 
Darwin, Charles (1871) The descent of man. London: John Murray. 
Running Head: Identity, Kinship, and the Evolution of Cooperation 
 40 
Dawes, Christopher T., Peter John Loewen, Darren Schreiber, Alan N. Simmons, Tom 
Flagan, Richard McElreath, Scott E. Bokemper, James H. Fowler, and Martin P. 
Paulus (2012) Neural basis of egalitarian behavior. PNAS 109(17):6479 – 6483.  
De Dreu, Carsten K.W., Lindred L. Greer, Michael J.J. Handgraff, Shaul Shalvi, Gerben 
A. Van Kleef, Matthijs Baas, Femke S. Ten Velden, Eric Van Dijk, and Sander 
W.W. Feith (2010) The neuropeptide oxytocin regulates parochial altruism in 
intergroup conflict among humans. Science 328:1408 – 1411.  
De Leersnyder, Jozefien, Michael Boiger, and Batja Mesquita (2013) Cultural regulation 
of emotion: Individual, relational, and structural sources. Frontiers in Psychology 
4:55.  
DiPaola, S. and Liane Gabora (2009) Incorporating characteristics of human creativity 
into an evolutionary algorithm. Genetic Programming and Evolvable Machines 
10(2) 97 – 110. 
Dunbar, R.I.M. (1992) Neocortex size as a constraint on group size in primates. Journal 
of Human Evolution 22(6) 469 – 493. 
Edelman, Gerald M. (2004) Wider than the sky: The phenomenal gift of consciousness. 
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.  
Ellemers, Naomi (2012) The group self. Science 336:848 – 852. 
Ellemers, Naomi, Russell Spears, and Bertjan Doosje (2002) Self and social identity. 
Annual Review of Psychology 53:161 – 186.  
Ellemers, Naomi, Stefno Paglino, and Manuela Barreto (2013) Morality and behavioral 
regulation in groups: A social identity approach. European Review of Social 
Psychology 24:160 – 193.  
Running Head: Identity, Kinship, and the Evolution of Cooperation 
 41 
Everett, Daniel L. Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes. NY: Pantheon. 
Farmer, J. Doyen, Stuart Kauffman, and Norman H. Packard (1986) Autocatalytic 
replication of polymers. Physica D 22:50 – 67. 
Fehr, Ernst, Urs Fischbacher, and Simon Gächter (2002) Strong reciprocity, human 
cooperation and the enforcement of social norms. Human Nature 13:1 – 25.  
Fortes, Meyer (1969) Kinship and the social order. Chicago: Aldine. 
Gabora, Liane (1998) Autocatalytic closure in a cognitive system: A tentative scenario 
for the origin of culture. Psycoloquy, 9(67). [adap-org/9901002] 
--- (2004) Ideas are not replicators but minds are. Biology & Philosophy 19:127-143. 
--- (2006) Self-other organization: Why early life did not evolve through natural 
selection. Journal of Theoretical Biology 241:443 – 450. 
--- (2013) An evolutionary framework for culture: Selectionism versus communal 
exchange. Physics of Life Reviews 10:117 – 145.  
Gabora, Liane and Diederik Aerts, D. (2009) A model of the emergence and evolution of 
integrated worldviews. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 53, 434-451.  
Gabora, Liane and Maegan Merrifield (2012) Dynamic disequlibrium, transformation, 
and the evolution and development of sustainable worldviews. In: Complexity 
science, living systems, and reflexing interfaces: New models and perspectives, eds. 
F. Orsuci, & N. Sala, pp. 69 – 77. IGI Global.  
Gabora, L. and K. Kitto (2013) Concept combination and the origins of complex 
cognition. In E. Swan (ed.) Origins of Mind: Biosemiotics Series, Vol. 8, Berlin: 
Springer, 361 – 382. 
Running Head: Identity, Kinship, and the Evolution of Cooperation 
42 
Gabora, Liane, & Mike Steel (2017) Autocatalytic networks in cognition and the origin of 
culture. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 431, 87-95.  
Gabora, L. and C. Smith (in press) Two cognitive transitions underlying the capacity for 
cultural evolution. Journal of Anthropological Sciences.  
Gallup, Jr., Gordon G. (1970) Chimpanzees: Self-recognition. Science 167:86 – 87. 
Gamble, Clive (2010) Technologies of separation and the evolution of social extension. 
In: Social brain, distributed mind, M. Dunbar, C. Gamble and J. Gowlett eds. 17 – 
42. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gervais, Matthew M and Daniel M.T. Fessler (2017) On the deep structure of social 
affect: Attitudes, emotions, sentiments, and the case of “contempt.” Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences 40: 1 – 18.  
Goddard, Cliff and Anna Wierzbicka (2004) Cultural scripts: what are they and what are 
they good for? Intercultural Pragmatics 1 – 2:c153 – 166. 
Greenwald, Anthony G., Laurie A. Rudman, Brian A. Nosek, Mahzarin R. Banaji, Shelly 
D. Farnham, and Deborah S. Mellott (2002) A unified theory of implicit attitudes, 
stereotypes, self-esteem, and self-concept. Psychological Review 101:3 – 25. 
Handerwerker, W. Penn (2015) Our Story: How Cultures Shaped People to Get Things 
Done Walnut Creek: Left Coast Press. 
Hardin, Curtis D. and E. Tory Higgins (1996) Shared reality: How social verification 
makes the subjective objective. In E.T. Higgins and R.M. Sorrentino (eds.) 
Handbook of Motivation and Cognition: The Interpersonal Context, Vol. 3 28 – 84 
Heine, Stephen J. (2001) Self as a cultural product: An examination of East Asian and 
North American selves. Journal of Personality 69:881 – 906. 
Running Head: Identity, Kinship, and the Evolution of Cooperation 
43 
Henrich, Joseph, Robert Boyd, Sam Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis, 
Richard McElreath, Michael Alvard, Abigail Barr, Jean Ensminger, Natalie Smith 
Henrich, Kim Hill, Francisco Gil-White, Michael Gurven, Frank W. Marlowe, John 
Q. Patton, and David Tracer (2005) “Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: 
Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 
28:795 – 855.  
Henrich, Joseph and Robert Boyd (2016) How evolved psychological mechanisms 
empower cultural group selection. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 39 
doi:10.1017/S0140525X15000138. 
Heyes, Cecilia (2012) Grist and mills: On the cultural origins of cultural learning. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 367:2181 – 2191. 
Hornsey, Mathew J. (2008) Social identity theory and self-categorization theory: A 
historical review. Social and Personality Psychology Compass 2:204 – 222.  
Jablonka, Eva, Simona Ginsberg, Daniel and Dor (2012) The co-evolution of language 
and emotion. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 367:2152 – 2159. 
Jackson, Adam and Richard Watson (2013) The effect of assortment on population 
structuring traits on the evolution of cooperation. In: Advances in artificial life 
ECAL 2013, P. Lio, O. Mitglino, G. Nicosia, S. Nolfi, and M. Pavone, eds. 356 – 
363. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.   
Jensen, Keith, Amrisha Vaish, and Marco F.H. Schmidt (2014) The emergence of human 
prosociality: aligning with others through feelings, concerns, and norms. Frontiers 
in Psychology 5 1 – 16. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00822.  
Running Head: Identity, Kinship, and the Evolution of Cooperation 
44 
Jost, John T. Allison Ledgerwood, and Curtis D. Hardin (2007) Shared reality, systems 
justification, and the relational basis of ideological beliefs. Social and Personality 
Psychology Compass 1 doi:10.1111/j.1751-9004.2007.00056.x 
Kauffman, Stuart (1993) The origins of order: Self-organization and selection in 
evolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Koopmann-Holm, Birgit and David Matsumoto (2011) Values and display rules for 
specific emotions. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 42(3):355 – 371.  
Lane, D., R. M. Maxfield, D. Read and S. van der Leeuw. 2009.  From population to 
organization thinking.  In Complexity Perspective in Innovation and Social Change.  
Lane, D., Pumain, D., Leeuw, S.E. van der, and West, G. eds 11-42.  Springer: 
Berlin. 
Kramer, Jos and Joël Meunier (2016) Kin and multilevel selection in social evolution: a 
never-ending controversy? F1000 Research 2016 5(F1000 Rev):76 
Leaf, Murray. and Dwight Read (2012) Human thought and social organization: 
Anthropology on a new plane. New York: Lexington.  
LeDoux, Joseph (2012) Rethinking the emotional brain. Neuron 73:653 – 676. 
Lehmann, L. and Laurent Keller (2006) The evolution of cooperation and altruism—A 
general framework and a classification of models. Journal of Evolutionary Biology 
19:1365 – 1376.  
Leidy, Denise P. and Robert A.F. Thurman (1997) Mandala: The Architecture of 
Enlightenment. NY: Asia Society Galleries. 
Lessing, Doris (1986) Prisons We Choose to Live Inside. Toronto: CBC Enterprises. 
Mantovani, Giuseppe (2000) Exploring borders. London: Routledge. 
Running Head: Identity, Kinship, and the Evolution of Cooperation 
45 
Markus, Hazel Rose and Shinobu Kitayama (1991) Culture and the self: Implications for 
cognition, emotion, and motivation. Psychological Review 98:224 – 253.  
--- (1994) The cultural construction of self and emotion: Implications for social behavior. 
In: Emotion and culture: Studies of mutual influence, H.R. Markus & S. Kitayama, 
eds. 89 – 130. Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association. 
--- (2010) Culture and selves: A cycle of mutual constitution. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science 5:420 – 430. 
Marlowe, Frank (2010) The Hazda: hunter-gatherers of Tanzania. Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press.  
Mathew, Sarah, Robert Boyd, and Matthijs Van Veelen (2013) Human cooperation 
among kin and close associates may require enforcement of norms by third parties. 
In: Cultural evolution, P. Richerson and M. Christensen eds. 45 – 60. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press.  
Maturana, Humberto R. and Francisco J. Varela (1980) Autopoiesis and cognition. The 
realization of the living. Berlin: Springer.  
McGeer, Victoria (2015) Mind making practices: the social infrastructure of self-knowing 
agency and responsibility. Philosophical Explorations 18(2) 251 – 289. 
Mercier, Hugh and Dan Sperber (2017) The Enigma of Reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Mesoudi, Alex (2011) Cultural evolution: How Darwinian Theory can explain human 
diversity and synthesize the social sciences. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
--- (2016) Cultural evolution: integrating psychology, evolution, and culture. Current 
Opinions in Psychology 7 17 – 22. 
Running Head: Identity, Kinship, and the Evolution of Cooperation 
46 
Mesquita, Batja and Robert Walker (2003) Cultural differences in emotion: A context for 
interpreting emotional experiences. Behavioral Research and Therapy 41:777 – 
793.  
Moffett, Mark W. (2013) Human identity and the evolution of societies. Human Nature 
24, 219 – 267. 
Narvaez, Darcia (2013) The 99 percent—development and socialization within an 
evolutionary context: Grow up to become a “good and useful human being.” In: 
War, peace and human nature: The convergence of evolutionary and cultural 
views. D. Fry ed. 643 – 672. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Nowak, Martin A. and Robert M. May (1992) Evolutionary games and spatial chaos. 
Nature 359:826 – 829. 
Nowak, Martin A. and Karl Sigmund (2004) Evolutionary dynamics of biological games. 
Science 303:793 – 799.  
Nummenmaa, Lauri, Enrico Glerean, Riitta Hari, and Jari K. Hietanen (2014) Bodily 
maps of emotions. PNAS 111:646 – 651.  
Ochsner, Kevin N. and James J. Gross (2005) The cognitive control of emotion. Trends 
in Cognitive Science 9(5):242 – 249.  
O’Gorman, Rick, Kennon S. Sheldon, and David Sloan Wilson (2008) For the good of 
the group? Exploring group-level evolutionary adaptations using multilevel 
selection theory. Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice 12(1) 17 – 26. 
Okasha, Samir (2005) Multilevel selection and the major transitions in evolution. 
Philosophy of Science 72(5) 1013 – 1025. 
Running Head: Identity, Kinship, and the Evolution of Cooperation 
47 
--- (2016) The relation between kin and multi-level selection: An approach using causal 
graphs. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67(2), 435 – 470. 
Okasha, Samir, John A. Weymark, and Walter Bossert (2014) Inclusive fitness 
maximization: An axiomatic approach. Journal of Theoretical Biology 350, 24 – 
31. 
Osgood, Charles E. and Percy H. Tannembaum (1955) The principle of congruity in the 
prediction of attitude change. Psychological Review 62:42 – 55. 
Packer, Craig (1977) Reciprocal altruism in olive baboons (Papio anubis). Nature 
265:441 – 443.  
Pessoa, L. and McMenamin, B. (2016) Dynamic networks in the emotional brain. The 
Neuroscientist 1 – 14. 
Phillips, Mary L., Wayne C. Drevets, Scott L. Rauch, and Richard Lane (2003) 
Neurobiology of emotion perception I: The neural basis of normal emotion 
perception. Biological Psychiatry 54(5): 504 – 514.  
Povinelli, Daniel J., M. de Veer, Gordon G. Gallup, L.A. Theall, L.A., and Ruud van den 
Bos (2003) An 8-year longitudinal study of mirror self-recognition in chimpanzees 
(Pan troglodytes). Neuropsychologia 41:229 – 334.  
Prigogine, Ilya and Gregoire Nicolis (1977) Self-organization in non-equilibrium systems. 
New York: Wiley.  
Quinn, Naomi (2006) Universals of child rearing. Anthropological Theory 5: 477 – 516. 
Read, Dwight (1987) Foraging society organization: A simple model of a complex 
transition. European Journal of Operational Research 30:230-236 
Running Head: Identity, Kinship, and the Evolution of Cooperation 
48 
--- (2003) From behavior to culture: An assessment of cultural evolution and a new 
synthesis. Complexity 8:14 – 41. 
--- (2007)	Kinship theory: A paradigm shift. Ethnology 46(4):329-364. 
--- (2008) Working memory: A cognitive limit to non-human primate recursive thinking 
prior to hominid evolution. Evolutionary Psychology 6:676 – 714. 
--- (2010)	From experiential-based to relational-based forms of social organization: A 
major transition in the evolution of Homo sapiens.  In social brain, distributed 
mind.  R. Dunbar, C. Gamble and J. Gowlett, Eds. Pp. 203-234.  Oxford University 
Press: Oxford. 
--- (2012a) How culture makes us human. Left Coast Press.  
--- (2012b) Culture: The missing piece in theories of weak and strong reciprocity.  
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35:35-36. 
--- (2015a) Kinship. In: Vocabulary for the study of religions, eds. R.A. Segal & K. von 
Stuckrad, pp. 302 – 308. Brill. 
--- (2015b) Kinship terminology. In: International encyclopedia of the social & 
behavioral sciences, pp. 61 – 66. Elsevier.  
--- (2017) From past to present: Kinship and the mission of anthropology. Plenary Talk, 
The XII Congress of Anthropologists and Ethnologists of Russia, Udmurt State 
University, July 3 – July 6, 2017. Izhevsk: Russia. 
Read, Dwight W. and Sander van der Leeuw (2008). Biology is only part of the story 
.... Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B. 363:1959–1968. 
---  (2015). The extension of social relations in time and space during the Palaeolithic and 
beyond. In: Settlement, society and cognition in human evolution. F. Coward, R. 
Running Head: Identity, Kinship, and the Evolution of Cooperation 
49 
Hosfield, M. Pope and F. Wenban-Smith, eds. 31-57. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Reich, Eugenie Samuel (2012) War of words over tribal tongue. Nature 485: 155 – 156. 
Richerson, Peter J. and Robert Boyd (2005) Not by genes alone: How culture 
transformed human evolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Richerson, Peter J., Robert Boyd, and Joseph Henrich (2010) Gene-culture coevolution in 
the age of genomics. PNAS 107:8985 – 8992. 
Richerson, Peter J. and Morten H. Christensen (2013) Introduction. In: Cultural 
evolution. Peter J. Richerson and M.H. Christensen, eds. 1 – 24. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press.  
Richerson, Peter J., Ryan Baldini, Adrian V. Bell, Kathryn Demps, Karl Frost, Vicken 
Hillis, Sarah Mathew, Emily K. Newton, Nicole Naar, Lesley Newson, Cody Ross, 
Paul E. Smaldino, Timothy M. Waring, and Matthew Zefferman (2016) Cultural 
group selection play an essential role in explaining human cooperation: A sketch of 
the evidence. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 39:30 - 49. 
Sahlins, Marshall (2013) What kinship is … and is not. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press.  
Searle, John (2010) The Construction of Social Reality. NY: Simon and Schuster.  
Seyfarth, Robert M. and Dorothy L. Cheney (2000) Social awareness in monkeys. 
Integrative and Comparative Biology 40:902 – 909.  
Silk, Joan B., Sarah Francis Brosnan, Joseph Henrich, Susan P. Lambeth, and Steven J. 
Shapiro (2013) Chimpanzees share food for many reasons: The role of kinship 
Running Head: Identity, Kinship, and the Evolution of Cooperation 
50 
reciprocity, social bonds and harassment on food transfers. Animal Behavior 85:941 
– 947.
Smaldino, Paul E. (2014) The cultural evolution of emergent group-level traits. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37:270 – 271. 
--- (2016) The evolution of the social self: Multidimensionality of social identity solves 
the coordination problems of a society. In: Beyond the meme: Articulating dynamic 
structures in cultural evolution, eds. W.C. Wimsatt & A.C. Love, (in press). 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.  
Smit, J.P., Filip  Buekens, and Stan Du Plessis (2011) What is money? An alternative to 
Searle’s institutional facts. Economics and Philosophy 27, 1 – 22. 
Spradley, James P. and Brenda J. Mann (1975) The cocktail waitress: The woman’s work 
in a man’s world. New York: Wiley.  
Stephens, Christopher (2005) Strong reciprocity and the comparative method. Analyse & 
Kritik 27:97 – 105.  
Sterelny, Kim (2012) The evolved apprentice. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Stets, Jan E. and Peter J. Burke (2000) Identity theory and social identity theory. Social 
Psychology Quarterly 63:224 – 237.  
Swann, Jr., William B., Jolanda Jetten, Angel Gómez, Harvy Whitehouse, and Brock 
Bastian (2014) When group membership gets personal: A theory of identity fusion. 
Psychological Review 119:441 – 456.  
Taylor, Peter D., Troy Day, and Geoff Wild (2007) From inclusive fitness to fixation 
probability in homogeneous structured populations. Journal of Theoretical Biology 
249: 101 – 110. 
Running Head: Identity, Kinship, and the Evolution of Cooperation 
51 
Tomasello, Michael (2014) A natural history of human thinking. Boston: Harvard 
University Press.  
Tritt, Shona Meliesa, Michael Inzlicht, and Eddie Harmon-Jones (2012) Toward a 
biological understanding of mortality salience (and other threat compensation 
processes). Social Cognition 30:715 – 733.  
Trommsdorff, Gisela and Pamela M. Cole (2011) Emotion, self-regulation, and social 
behavior in cultural contexts. In: Socioemotional development in cultural context. 
Xinyin Chen, ed. 131 – 163. New York: Guilford.  
Tsai, Jeanne L. (2007) Ideal affect: Cultural causes and behavioral consequences. 
Perspectives on Psychological Science 2: 242 – 259.  
Tsai, Jeanne L., Flecity F. Miso, Emma Seppala, Helene H. Fung, and Dannii Y. Yeung 
(2007) Influence and adjustment goals: Sources of cultural differences in ideal 
affect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 92I:1102 – 1117. 
Turchin, Peter (2013) The puzzle of human ultrasociality: How did large-scale complex 
societies evolve? In: Cultural evolution. P.J. Richerson & M.H. Christensen, eds. 
61 – 74. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Turnbull, Colin (1961) The Forest People NY: Simon & Schuster. 
van der Leeuw, Sander (2018). Closing remarks: novel approaches to complex societal 
change and sustainability. Sustainability Science DOI: 10.1007/s11625-018-0581-
2 
van der Toorn, Jojanneke, Naomi Ellemers, and Bertjan Doosje (2015) The threat of 
moral transgression: The impact of group membership and moral opportunity. 
European Journal of Social Psychology 45:609 – 622.  
Running Head: Identity, Kinship, and the Evolution of Cooperation 
52 
Vetsigian, Kalin, Carl Worse, and Nigel Goldenfeld (2006) Collective evolution and the 
genetic code. PNAS 103:10696 – 10701.  
Voorhees, Burton, Dwight Read, and Liane Gabora (2018) The objectivity of moral 
norms is a top down cultural construct. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41:31-32.. 
Watts, David P. (2002) Reciprocity and interchange in the social relationships of wild 
male chimpanzees. Behaviour 139:347 – 370.  
Weissner, Polly (1998) Indoctrinability and the evolution of socially defined kinship. In 
F. Salter and I. Eibl-Eibesfeldt (eds.) Warfare, Ideology and Indoctrinability. 
Osford: Berghahn Books. 
Weissner, Polly (2009) Experimental games and games of life among the Kalahari 
Bushmen. Current Anthropology 50:133 – 138. 
West, Stuart, Ashleigh Griffin, and A. Gardner, A. (2007) Social semantics: How useful 
has group selection been? Journal of Evolutionary Biology 21:374 – 385.  
West, Stuart and Ashleigh Gardner (2013) Adaptation and inclusive fitness. Current 
Biology 23: R577 – R584.  
Whitehouse, Harvey, Jonathan Jong, Michael D. Buhrmester, Angel Gómez, Brock 
Bastian, Christopher M. Kavanagh, Martha Newson, Miriam Matthews, Jonathn A. 
Lanman, Ryan McKay, and Sergey Gavrilets (2017) The evolution of extreme 
cooperation via shared dysphoric experiences. Scientific Reports 7:44292 
doi:10.1038/srep44292  
Whiten, Andrew and David Erdal (2012) The human socio-cognitive niche and its 
evolutionary origins. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 367: 2119 
– 2129.
Running Head: Identity, Kinship, and the Evolution of Cooperation 
53 
Zawizski, Tadeusz Wieslaw (2013) Mindshaping. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Zefferman, Matthew R. and Peter J. Richerson (2014) Many important group-level traits 
are institutions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37: 280 – 281. 
End Notes: 
1	This can be multi-layered as indicated by the traditional Bedouin saying: “I 
against my brothers; my brothers and I against our cousins; I, my brothers, and our 
cousins against the world.” 
2 We realize that the coherence and unity provided by cultural idea systems may 
only be apparent, that there may well be internal contradictions. The point is that for 
individuals enculturated within a cultural idea system, it does appear coherent and 
unified. When contradictions do appear the reaction is to produce rationalizations that 
explain them away (e.g., Mercier and Sperber 2017).   
3	The word syntonization well captures our meaning, it refers to (a) the 
establishment of communication between distinct electronic circuits through bringing 
them to the same frequency; and (b) to the tuning of voices in a choir to produce a 
harmonious performance. 
4 When this top down behavioral control breaks down, explosions of violent 
response can occur and the frequency of such occurrences gives a measure of the degree 
of stability of social control.  
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5 This is far more threatening in small hunter-gatherer bands where the possibility 
of ostracism exerts powerful social control. For example, see the story of Cehpu related 
in Turnbull (1961). The threat remains in all societies, however, and can exert a powerful 
conformist influence (Lessing 1986). 
6 We bear in mind, however, that “it isn’t known whether primates form societies 
by primates recognizing and bonding to the group as a whole… rather than bonding to 
other members individually.” (Moffett 2013: 227) so further research in this area is 
required. 
7	Our approach is closely related to recent work of McGeer (e.g., 2015) and 
Zawidski (2013) and we thank an anonymous referee for bringing this to our attention. 
8 There is an analogy between cultural idea systems and the way that mandalas are 
used in Tibetan Buddhism. In appearance, a mandala is structured as a collection of 
images surrounding a central image (usually a specific deity). The central image itself 
contains a number of items such as weapons, bells, nooses, and so on. Superficially, a 
follower of the Tibetan system seems to use a mandala simply as part of a meditative 
exercise. In fact, the meditator will have spent many hours of preparatory meditation on 
the details of the various elements of the mandala, developing a direct understanding of 
their meaning in the Tibetan system. The mandala acts as a synthetic image that 
correlates all of its various elements into a coherent gestalt that conveys information 
descriptive of a psychological state that the meditator seeks to experience in greater depth 
(Leidy and Thurman 1997). In the same way, an enculturated individual sees multiple 
elements of cultural idea systems in their everyday environment, which act both to 
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reinforce enculturation and provide a framework of understanding and familiarity. The 
entire complex of cultural ideas could well be termed a “cultural mandala.” 
9Smit and his collaborators take a very different view of “institutional facts” than 
does Searle, but both agree on the social nature of such “facts.” 
10 There is lack of agreement in the emotion literature as to a label for what we are 
calling feelings and emotions. Gervais and Fessler (2017), for example, use the terms 
“basic affective system” (emotions) and “folk affective concepts” (feelings). Our usage 
follows Damasio (2010). 
